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From this perspective it was apparent that the United States did not deem the conflict so vital to American interests that it was worth a Sino-American confrontation, yet it was still considered crucial enough for the United States to be willing to increase its involvement and pay the costs of an enlarged though still limited commitment.
official Chinese Government statement expressed its support for the Indochinese people and noted that China "has expressed the utmost self-restraint. . . . China has not sent a single soldier to Indo-China. However there is a limit to everything." '6 By late summer of that year the situation deteriorated even further. The American reaction to the Tonkin Gulf incident in August established the precedent of direct American air attacks on North Vietnam. The Chinese immediately responded by sending a squadron of MiG-17s to Hanoi for use against future American air attacks.17 By the autumn of 1964 construction had begun on a number of new airfields in South China. According to Allen S. Whiting, former director of the State Department Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, both the timing and the location of these were a direct reaction to the threat of American escalation in Vietnam. 18 By the end of 1964 China was clearly signalling to the United States that it did not want to go to war over Vietnam but that it would continue to aid its ally and defend itself if attacked. The United States either failed to apprehend or simply ignored these signals. It was another year before both powers managed to arrive at a mutual understanding of their objectives in the conflict and thus prevent misperception and an inadvertent clash.
Prior to the sharp American escalation in 1965 the Chinese leadership still looked at Vietnamese developments optimistically. Chairman Mao Tse-tung expected a favourable resolution to the conflict within two years at most.'1 But Washington's increasing role in the conflict coupled with Moscow's reawakened interest in South-east Asia necessitated a Chinese reassessment of its basic policy in Indochina. One aspect of this reassessment took the form of a publicized " strategic debate." 20 shoulder to shoulder with the South Vietnamese people whenever the latter so require." 27 This explicit declaration of support was still highly qualified and somewhat ambiguous since: (1) the Chinese people rather than the Chinese Government made the offer, (2) the Chinese were " ready " to send troops although they "will" send arms and material support, and (3) forces would be sent when they were required, implying a future possibility rather than a present contingency.
One P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking and member of the Politburo, in a lengthy speech before the Indonesian Communist Party, outlined the Chinese conception of the international scene and the means by which imperialism and modern revisionism could be defeated." The four basic contradictions in the world not only still existed but were " becoming increasingly acute." 9 The contradiction between American imperialism and the "oppressed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America" had developed into the " principal" contradiction. In nonideological language the United States was now the greatest threat to the Third World. P'eng argued that the only way to counter such a development was to recognize this fact and to unite against it:
The people of the world can definitely defeat this ferocious enemy provided that they already recognize U.S. imperialism as their chief enemy, unite with all the forces that can be united and form the broadest possible united front against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.40
While arguing for a broad united front P'eng explicitly excluded the Soviet Union (" Khrushchev revisionists ") because it sought to suppress the revolutionary movement in the Third World and was thereby serving imperialism and promoting neo-colonialism. Mere opposition to imperialism was not enough; it must be combined with and even preceded by opposition to revisionism. China's policy of a broad united front was not only aimed at countering the American threat, but also at bringing the Lo Jui-ch'ing also stressed the importance of a people's war more than he had previously, giving emphasis to the political aspects of the struggle. Still maintaining his pessimistic, " worst possible case" outlook, Lo warned: " It is possible that U.S. imperialism may go mad in trying to save itself from its doom; we must take this into full account and make preparations against its expansion of the war of aggression in Viet Nam and against any war it may impose on us." 46 Lo took an even harder line towards negotiations with the United States, arguing that American proposals were merely " smokescreens " to obscure their actual intentions, to sow discord among forces opposed to them, and to allow them time to gain " breathing space " so that they could consolidate their forces for future assaults. This sharp attack Lin Piao faction had dominated the opposition. Lo's purge was the first of many which occurred throughout the Cultural Revolution. According to a study of Lo's downfall the major issues involved centred upon domestic policy rather than foreign policy or strategic doctrine.
. . . the most important issue was Lo's insistence that the PLA reorder its priorities, reduce its domestic activities, and make urgent preparations against an American attack. To the Maoists, these proposals involved unacceptable political and economic costs, and placed Lo's loyalty and reliability in serious question.5 Therefore, although there was disagreement over the most appropriate strategy of defence against the escalating Vietnam war and differing perceptions of the imminence of an American attack on China, these differences were within tolerable limits, at least while the questions were being debated.
By the latter part of 1965 or early 1966 major decisions were reached on China's response to the Vietnam war. China decided to limit its involvement in the Vietnam conflict but it was not sure that the United States would not escalate the conflict and make China's active involvement inevitable. As a precautionary measure various domestic activities were undertaken. In southern China limited evacuation of the major cities was initiated.52 This and related measures were primarily defensive, indicating that the Chinese leadership did not expect an imminent attack, but still could not rule out that possibility. While the Chinese reportedly adjusted their economic planning to take into account the possibility of an American attack, efforts were made to avoid war hysteria which might affect production. The main thrust of the economy continued to be directed towards national development rather than preparation for war.5: During this period the Chinese press toned down its statements of support for the Vietnamese, and references to earlier pledges to send volunteers were virtually non-existent. Offers of support were ambiguous and non-committal, such as " we . . . will give the Vietnamese people as much support as they require for as long as they need it. latter position was apparently favoured by some of Mao's domestic opponents who were purged or humiliated during the Cultural Revolution that soon followed. Therefore the impending Cultural Revolution and Mao's hostility towards the Soviet Union were probably the major factors activating Mao's prediction of a Sino-American confrontation rather than a realistic belief that such a war was imminent. In fact, by the summer of 1966 the Cultural Revolution's disruptive efforts soon began to be felt, which seemed to indicate that the most serious threats to the Chinese political system were perceived by Mao and others to come from within the body politic rather than from without.
Rumours of the tacit understanding began to appear in the foreign press in late 1966. In September Izvestia commented on a Japanese interview with Ch'en Yi, when the latter allegedly remarked that Peking did not necessarily preclude the idea of negotiations with the United States in order to resolve the Vietnam question. This report also included an Agence France-Presse dispatch which stated: "It was said in informed circles that the Chinese and American ambassadors in Warsaw clearly defined conditions which will prevent a 'clash' between the two countries in Vietnam." 84 The Soviet Union continued to follow this line in later publications. In November Pravda charged that the Chinese were " pursuing a line calculated to leave them outside the struggle against imperialism" and it was not surprising that "... the bourgeois press is now disseminating reports about a tacit agreement of China with the U.S.A. and other capitalist countries which are pleased with China's present policy." 85 The western non-communist press also carried reports of a 
